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1 Introduction
A central theorem in implementation theory when there are at least three
agents is that Maskin monotonicity and the property of no-veto power are
su¢ cient conditions for (exact) Nash implementability of social choice cor-
respondences (SCC s) (Maskin, 1999). Yet, unlikely Maskin monotonicity, a
Nash-implementable SCC does not necessarily meet the condition of no-veto
power.1 Moreover, a number of interesting SCC s do not satisfy this con-
dition. For example, individual rational, weak core, no-envy SCC s violate
the condition of no-veto power. This has, in turn, motivated the study of
the implications of modifying the canonical (Maskin-) mechanisms in various
ways, and has turned in a number of alternatives to it.
By retaining the standard denition of Nash implementation, Benoît and
Ok (2008) introduce mechanisms which allow for randomizations among so-
cial outcomes, labeled simple stochastic mechanisms. While these mecha-
nisms allow for randomizations, these randomizations can take place only o¤
the equilibrium path; in equilibrium, only pure social outcomes are chosen.
As each agent must be able to evaluate uncertain prospects when lotteries
are employed, Benoît and Ok (2008) extend each agents preference relation
dened over (pure) social outcomes in the following natural way: an agent
prefers a social outcome x to a randomization between that outcome and a
dispreferred outcome y, and that randomization to the dispreferred outcome
y. Under this preference extension and a domain restriction (top-coincidence
condition), which is satised by typical environments arising in economic
analysis, they show that any weakly unanimous SCC is Nash-implementable
if and only if it is Maskin monotonic;2 that is Benoît-Oks Theorem. There-
fore, they characterize Nash implementability without appealing to the aux-
iliary condition of no-veto power.
In this paper, we deal with the informational e¢ ciency issue pertaining
to Benoît-Oks Theorem. These authors constructed game forms which are
rather general. Not surprisingly, this generality comes to a price in terms
of the informational demands imposed on agents in order to guarantee Nash
implementability: Every agent is required to reveal not only his own pref-
1An SCC satises the condition of no-veto power if it selects all social outcomes which
are top-ranked by all except at most one agent.
2A social outcome is weakly unanimous if it is top-ranked by all agents and it is the
unique top-ranked outcome for at least one agent. An SCC is weakly unanimous if it
selects socially weakly unanimous outcomes.
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erences but also the preferences of all other agents, a social outcome and a
positive integer not exceeding the number of agents (agent index). As the
message space has e¢ ciency implications for informational decentralization,
we modify Benoît and Oks mechanism in which these demands are signi-
cantly decreased.
Following Saijo (1988), we can image arranging agents in a clockwise circle
facing inward, and require that each agent ` announces, a social outcome, an
agent index, her own preferences and the preferences of the agent standing
immediately to her left, that is, of agent ` + 1. Based on this idea, the
paper shows that any weakly unanimous SCC is Maskin monotonic if and
only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed
with Saijos message space specication, under the mild domain restriction
of top-coincidence condition.
From this result, it follows that there is an equivalence relationship be-
tween Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms endowed with
Saijos message space specication and Benoît-Oks Theorem. This result is
in line with other results of Nash implementation theory. In particular, the
reported equivalence relationship is analogous to the equivalence relationship
between Nash implementation by s-mechanisms and Nash implementation by
canonical mechanisms (Lombardi and Yoshihara, 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notation
and denitions. In Section 3, Nash implementation via simple stochastic
mechanisms is dened, a simple stochastic mechanism with the aforesaid
strategy space reduction is constructed, and, nally, our Theorem is stated
and proved. Section 4 concludes briey.
2 Preliminaries
The environment is (N;X;Rn), whereN := f1; :::; ng is a set of n  3 agents,
X := fx; y; z; :::g is the set of attainable alternatives (or outcomes), andRn is
the set of admissible preference proles (or states of the world). Henceforth,
we assume that the cardinality of X is #X  2. Let R (X) be the set of all
complete preorders on X.3 Then Rn := R1 :::Rn is a nonempty subset of
the n-fold Cartesian product Rn (X) := R1 (X) ::::Rn (X), where each
Ri (X) is a copy of R (X). An element of Rn is denoted by <:= (<1; :::;<n),
where its ith component is <i2 Ri (i 2 N). The symmetric and asymmetric
3A preorder is a reexive and transitive binary relation.
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factors of any <i2 Ri are denoted i and i, respectively. As usual, for
any x; y 2 X and <i2 Ri (i 2 N) we write (x; y) 2<i as x <i y. For any
preference prole <2 Rn and any i 2 N , let (<) i be the list of elements of
< for all agents except i, i.e., (<) i = (<1; :::;<i 1;<i+1; :::;<n). Given a list
(<) i and <i2 Ri of agent i, we denote by
 
(<) i ;<i

the preference prole
consisting of these<i and (<) i. For any (<i; x) 2 RiX let L (<i; x) denote
agent is lower section of <i at x, that is, L (<i; x) := fy 2 Xjx <i yg. For
any<i2 Ri (i 2 N), letmax<i X be the set of maximal alternatives according
to <i, that is, max<i X := fx 2 Xjx <i y for all y 2 Xg.
Fix an environment (N;X;Rn). A social choice correspondence (SCC )
on Rn is a correspondence F : Rn  X with ; 6= F (<) j X for all <2 Rn.
An SCC F on Rn is monotonic if, for all <;<02 Rn with x 2 F (<), we have
that x 2 F (<0) whenever L (<i; x) j L (<0i; x) for all i 2 N .4 It satises no-
veto power if, for all <2 R, we have that x 2 F (<) whenever x 2 max<i X
for at least n   1 agents. It is said weakly unanimous if, for all <2 Rn,
fxg = Ti2N max<i X implies x 2 F (<).
A (canonical) mechanism is a pair (M;h), whereM :=M1:::Mn, with
each Mi being a (nonempty) set, and h : M ! X. It consists of a message
space M , where Mi is the message space for agent i 2 N , and an outcome
function h. Let mi 2 Mi denote a generic message (or strategy) for agent
i. A message prole is denoted m = (m1; :::;mn) 2 M . For any message
prole m 2 M and i 2 N , let m i be the list (mj)j2Nnfig 2 j2NnfigMj of
elements of m for all agents except i, i.e., m i = (m1; :::;mi 1;mi+1; :::;mn).
Denote the set of such m i by M i for each i 2 N . Given a list m i 2 M i
and a message mi 2 Mi of agent i, we denote by (mi;m i) the message
prole consisting of these mi and m i. Given the environment (N;X;Rn),
a mechanism (M;h) induces a class of (non-cooperative) normal form games
f(M;h;R (<)) j <2 Rng, where (M;h;R (<)) is a normal form game in which
N is the set of agent, Mi is agent is message space, and R (<) is a list
(R (<i))i2N of complete preorders R (<i), where each R (<i) is dened on
M as mR (<i)m if and only if h (m) <i h (m). Given a normal form
game (M;h;R (<)), we say that m 2M is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
(Nash equilibrium, hereafter) at the state < if and only if, for all i 2 N ,
mR (<i) (mi ;m i) for all mi 2 Mi. Let N (M;h;R (<)) denote the set
of Nash equilibria of (M;h;R (<)), whereas Nh (M;h;R (<)) represents its
corresponding set of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
4Weak set inclusion is denoted by j.
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Given the environment (N;X;Rn), a mechanism (M;h) is said to imple-
ment F in Nash equilibria, or simply Nash-implements F , if and only if
Nh (M;h;R (<)) = F (<) for all <2 Rn.
If such a mechanism exists then F is Nash-implementable.
In his seminal paper, given an environment (N;X;Rn) (in which at least
three agents operate), Maskin (1999) proves that any SCC F is monotonic
whenever it is Nash-implementable. Moreover, any SCC F which satises
monotonicity and no-veto power is Nash-implementable; this isMaskins The-
orem. Moore and Repullo (1990), Dutta and Sen (1991), Danilov (1992),
Sjöström (1991), and Yamato (1992) rened Maskins Theorem, providing
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for Nash implementation.
3 Nash implementation by simple stochastic
mechanisms
3.1 Notations and denitions
For any distinct x; y 2 X, let x  y be an object which is not in X. Let
x := x  x. Following Benoît and OK (2008) x  y can be thought as a
lottery that gives x with probability 1=2 and y with probability 1=2. Let
X := fx yjx; y 2 X g. For any i 2 N and <i2 Ri (X), a preorder <i2
Ri (X) is said to be a monotonic extension of <i if, for all x; y 2 X,
i. x <i y , x <i y;
ii. x i y ) x i x y i y and x i y ) x i x y i y.
Condition i. and part of condition ii. mean that <i is an extension of <i
as they require that <ij<i and iji . Condition ii. also requires that
an agent i prefers an outcome x to a randomization between x and the
dispreferred outcome y, and that randomization to the dispreferred outcome
y.
Let  (<i) be the set of all monotonic extensions of <i2 Ri. Given a pref-
erence prole <2 Rn dene  (<) := f(<1; :::;<n) j <i2  (<i) for i 2 Ng.
Thus a generic element of  (<) is <:= (<1; :::;<n) which is a listing of
monotonic extended preorders, one for each agent. Finally, for any Rn j
Rn (X), let  (Rn) := S f (<) j <2 Rng.
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A simple stochastic mechanism is a pair (M; ), whereM :=M1:::Mn,
with eachMi being a (nonempty) set, and  :M ! X. It consists of a mes-
sage space M , where Mi is the message space for agent i 2 N , and an out-
come function . Then, the mechanism (M; ) assigns to each message prole
m 2M either an outcome in X or a mixing of two outcomes in X. Given a
simple stochastic mechanism (M; ) and a message prole m 2 M , for each
agent i 2 N let  (Mi;m i) := f (m0i;m i) 2 Xj for some m0i 2Mig be the
set outcomes attainable by this agent when all other agents are reporting
m i.
Given the environment (N;X;Rn), a simple stochastic mechanism (M; )
induces a class of (non-cooperative) normal form games f(M; ;R (<)) j <2  (Rn)g,
where (M; ;R (<)) is a normal form game in which N is the set of agents,
Mi is agent is message space, and R (<) is a list (R (<i ))i2N of preorders
R (<i ), where each R (<i ) is dened on M as mR (<i )m if and only if
 (m) <i  (m). Given a normal form game (M; ;R (<)), the set of
Nash equilibrium strategy proles is denoted by N (M; ;R (<)), whereas
N (M; ;R (<)) represents the corresponding set of Nash equilibrium out-
comes. We omit formal denitions.
Given the environment (N;X;Rn), a simple stochastic mechanism (M; )
is said to implement F in Nash equilibria, or simply Nash-implements F , if
and only if
N (M; ;R (<)) = F (<) for all <2 Rn and <2  (<)
If such a simple stochastic mechanism exists then F is Nash-implementable
by a simple stochastic mechanism.
We make the following very weak regularity assumptions on environments
(N;X;Rn). An environment (N;X;Rn) is said to satisfy the top-coincidence
condition if, for any <2 Rn and any I j N , with #I = n   1, the setT
i2I max<i X is at most a unit set (Benoît and Ok, 2008). Next, we state
Benoît-Oks Theorem.
Theorem (Benoît and Ok, 2008). Let (N;X;Rn) be an environment sat-
isfying the top-coincidence condition. Then, any weakly unanimous SCC F
on Rn is monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable by a simple sto-
chastic mechanism with message space Mi = Rn  X  N for each agent
i 2 N .
3.2 Theorem
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Fix the environment (N;X;Rn) and let (M; ) be a simple stochastic mech-
anism, where the message space of agent i (2 N) isMi = RiRi+1XN .
Fix any m 2 M , E 2 Rn, and x 2 X, and let mi =
 
Eii;Eii+1; xi; ki
 2 Mi,
where i+ 1 = 1 if i = n, and where the announcement of agent i 2 N about
agent js preferences is Eij. We say that the message prole m 2M is:
i. consistent with E and x if, for all j 2 N , Ejj = Ej 1j = Ej and xj = x,
where j   1 = n if j = 1.
ii. m i consistent with x and E, where i 2 N , if for all j 2 N : xj = x, and
for all j 2 Nnfi; i + 1g : Ejj = Ej 1j = Ej, Ei 1i = Ei, Ei+1i+1 = Ei+1,
and [Eii 6= Ei or Eii+1 6= Ei+1], where `  1 = n if ` = 1 for ` 2 fi; jg.
iii. m i quasi-consistent with x and E, where i 2 N , if for all j 2 Nnfig :
xj = x 6= xi, and for all j 2 Nnfi; i+ 1g : Ejj = Ej 1j = Ej, Ei 1i = Ei
and Ei+1i+1 = Ei+1, where `  1 = n if ` = 1 for ` 2 fi; jg.
The idea of our simple stochastic mechanism is similar in structure to the
one used in Saijo (1988). Let us dene the outcome function  :M ! X as
follows: For any m 2M ,
Rule 1: m is consistent with x and E 2 Rn, where x 2 F (E), then  (m) =
x.
Rule 2: For some i 2 N , m is m i consistent with x and E 2 Rn, where
x 2 F (E), then  (m) = x
Rule 3: For some i 2 N , m is m i quasi-consistent with x and E 2 Rn,
where x 2 F (E), and L  Ei 1i ; x 6= X, then
 (m) =

xi  x if xi 2 L  Ei 1i ; x
x otherwise.
(1)
Rule 4: Otherwise,  (m) = x`(m) where ` (m) :=
P
j2N
kj (mod n).5
The following properties are implied by the above rules:
5It is clear that if the remainder is zero the winner of the game is agent n.
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1. If all agents make the same outcome announcement, then the unani-
mously announced outcome is the outcome of the mechanism;
2. InRules 2-3, agent i is a deviator. InRule 2, agent i is not necessarily
the only deviator whenever there is exactly one break in the preference
announcement prole between agent is preference announcement and
that of agent i   1, i.e., Eii 6= Ei 1i = Ei and Eii+1 = Ei+1i+1 = Ei+1.
Indeed, agents i  1 and i could be deviators if
x 2 F  E11; :::;Ei 1i 1;Ei 1i ;Ei+1i+1; :::;Enn
and
x 2 F  E11; :::;Ei 2i 2;Ei 2i 1;Eii; :::;Enn .
In Rule 3, however, as agent i is the only agent reporting an outcome
di¤erent from that reported by all others the mechanism identies him
as the unique deviator;
3. In Rule 3, deviator is preference announcement
 
Eii;Eii+1

does not
a¤ect the evaluation of the SCC F as it does not enter into the evalu-
ation of the preference announcement prole 
E11; :::;Ei 1i 1;Ei 1i ;Ei+1i+1; :::;Enn

= (E1; :::;Ei 1;Ei;Ei+1; :::;En) ;
4. If Rule 3 applies to m, then the outcome is a lottery xi  x whenever
deviator is outcome is no better than the outcome x announced by
others under the preference for i announced by the agent i   1, i.e.,
Ei 1i ;
5. In Rule 4, agent i can appropriately choose an integer index to des-
ignate himself or some other agent as the winner of the modulo game
given other agentsinteger announcements.
The mechanism employs the idea due to Saijo (1988) to cover twice each
agents preferences: agent is preferences are covered by his own announce-
ment and by that of agent i   1. This allows us to nd a preference prole
which is una¤ected by the deviators preference announcement. In Rules
2-3, even though the deviator sends a di¤erent message announcement he
can never induce Rule 4. The outcome is conned to a lottery between the
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outcome x announced by others and that announced by the deviator when-
ever the latter is in L
 
Ei 1i ; x

. As usual the deviators lower contour set
is evaluated not by his own preference announcement Eii, but by that of his
neighbor Ei 1i .
We are now ready to verify that the above simple stochastic mechanism
Nash-implements every weakly unanimous SCC F whenever the implemen-
tation environment satises the condition of top-coincidence.
Theorem. Let (N;X;Rn) be an environment satisfying the top-coincidence
condition. Let F be a weakly unanimous SCC. Then, F is monotonic if
and only if a simple stochastic mechanism (M; ) dened by Rules 1-4 with
message space Mi = Ri Ri+1 X N implements F in Nash equilibria.
3.3 Proof of Theorem
Let (N;X;Rn) be an environment satisfying the top-coincidence condition.
The proof of the "If" part of Theorem is checked in Benoît and Ok (2008).
Let F onRn be a weakly unanimous SCC satisfying monotonicity. Let  2 N
be an arbitrary integer. We show that for any <2 Rn and any <2  (<):
F (<) = N (M; ;R (<)).
Lemma 1. Let <2 Rn and <2  (<). Then, F (<) j N (M; ;R (<)).
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Let x 2 F (<). Let mi =
 
<ii;<ii+1; xi; 

=
(<i;<i+1; x; ) for each i 2 N . By Rule 1 it follows that  (m) = x. More-
over, for each i 2 N as L  <i 1i ; x = L (<i; x) and <i is a monotonic ex-
tension of <i it follows that x <i xi  x for any xi 2 L (<i; x). Therefore,
 (Mi;m i) j L (<i ; x) and so x 2 N (M; ;R (<)), as sought. 
Lemma 2. Let (N;X;Rn) be an environment satisfying the top-coincidence
condition. Let F on Rn be a weakly unanimous and monotonic SCC. Then,
for any <2 R and any <2  (<): N (M; ;R (<)) j F (<).
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Let m be a Nash equilibrium message prole
of N (M; ;R (<)). We show that  (m) 2 F (<). Consider the following
cases.
Suppose that m falls intoRule 1. Then, m is consistent with x and E 2 Rn,
where x 2 F (E). Thus,  (m) = x. Take any agent i 2 N . Suppose
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that L
 
Ei 1i ; x
 6= X. For any y 2 L  Ei 1i ; x nfxg, changing his message
announcement mi into mi =
 
Eii ;Eii+1; y; 
 2 Mi agent i can alter the
current outcome to a lottery x y =  (mi ;m i) by Rule 3. However, x <i
x y as m 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Since <i is a monotonic extension of <i, we
have that x <i y. Otherwise, let us consider the case that L
 
Ei 1i ; x

= X.
Thus, for any y 2 L  Ei 1i ; x nfxg, by changing the announcement mi into
mi =
 
Eii ;Eii+1; y; ki
 2 Mi agent i can trigger the modulo game. To
attain the outcome y agent i has only to adjust the integer index so that he
becomes the winner of the modulo game. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<)) and
<i is a monotonic extension of <i, it follows x <i y. Because it holds for any
y 2 L (Ei; x) nfxg and any i 2 N , it follows that L
 
Ei 1i ; x

= L (Ei; x) j
L (<i; x) for all i 2 N . Monotonicity implies that x 2 F (<).
Suppose that m falls into Rule 2. Then m is m i consistent with x and
E 2 Rn, where x 2 F (E). Thus,  (m) = x. We proceed according to
the following sub-cases: 1) Eii 6= Ei and Eii+1 6= Ei+1, 2) Eii 6= Ei and
Eii+1 = Ei+1 and 3) Eii = Ei and Eii+1 6= Ei+1.
Sub-case 2.1. Eii 6= Ei and Eii+1 6= Ei+1
Then agent i 2 N is the unique deviator. Any other agent j 2 Nn fig can
attain any y 2 Xn fxg by inducing Rule 4, so that x 2 max<j X by our
supposition thatm 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Let us consider agent i. Suppose that
L
 
Ei 1i ; x
 6= X. Take any y 2 L  Ei 1i ; x nfxg. By changing his message
announcement mi into m{ =
 
Eii ;Eii+1; y; 
 2 Mi agent i can alter the
current outcome to a lottery x y =  (mi ;m i) by Rule 3. However, x <i
xy asm 2 N (M; ;R (<)). It follows from the denition of<i that x <i y.
Otherwise, let L
 
Ei 1i ; x

= X. Thus, for any y 2 L  Ei 1i ; x nfxg, by
changing the announcementmi intomi =
 
Eii ;Eii+1; y; ki
 2Mi agent i can
trigger the modulo game. To attain the outcome y agent i has only to adjust
the integer index ki so that  (m i;mi ) = y. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<))
and <i is a monotonic extension of <i, it follows x <i y. Since it holds for
any y 2 L (Ei; x) nfxg, it follows that L
 
Ei 1i ; x

= L (Ei; x) j L (<i; x).
Again, monotonicity implies that x 2 F (<).
Sub-case 2.2. Eii 6= Ei and Eii+1 = Ei+1
We distinguish whether x 2 F (E0), where E0 :=  (E) i ;Eii, or not. Sup-
pose that x 62 F (E0). Then agent i is the unique deviator. The same
reasoning used above for sub-case 2.1 carries over into this sub-case, so that
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x 2 F (<). Otherwise, let x 2 F (E0). Agent j 2 Nn fi  1; ig can attain
any other y 2 Xn fxg by inducing Rule 4, so that x 2 max<j X by our
supposition that m 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Consider agent i  1. Suppose that
L
 
Ei 2i 1; x
 6= X. For any y 2 L  Ei 2i 1; x nfxg, changing his message an-
nouncement mi 1 into mi 1 =
 
Ei 1i 1 ;Ei 1i ; y; 
 2 Mi 1 agent i   1 can
alter the current outcome to a lottery x  y =   mi 1;m (i 1) by Rules
3. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<)) we have that x <i 1 x  y, and so x <i 1 y
as <i 1 is a monotonic extension of <i 1. Otherwise, let L
 
Ei 2i 1; x

= X.
Thus, for any y 2 L  Ei 2i 1; x nfxg, by changing the announcementmi 1 into
mi 1 =
 
Ei 1i 1 ;Ei 1i ; y; ki 1
 2 Mi 1 agent i   1 can trigger the modulo
game. To attain the outcome y agent i 1 has only to adjust the integer index
ki 1 so that 
 
m (i 1);mi 1

= y. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<)) and <i 1 is
a monotonic extension of <i 1, it follows x <i 1 y. Since it holds for any
y 2 L  Ei 2i 1; x = L  Ei 1i 1; x, it follows that L (Ei 1; x) j L (<i 1; x). By
applying the same reasoning for agent i where y 2 L  Ei 1i ; x = L (Ei; x) we
have that L (Ei; x) j L (<i; x). Maskin monotonicity implies that x 2 F (<).
Sub-case 2.3. Eii = Ei and Eii+1 6= Ei+1
We distinguish whether x 2 F (E0), where E0 :=

(E) (i+1) ;Eii+1

, or not.
Again, if x 62 F (E0) then agent i is the unique deviator, and by the same
reasoning used in sub-case 2.1 we have that x 2 F (<). Otherwise, let x 2
F (E0). Then m is m (i+1) consistent with x and E0. It follows from the
sub-case 2.2 that x 2 F (<).
Suppose that m falls into Rule 3. Then m is m i quasi-consistent with x
and E 2 Rn, where x 2 F (E), and L  Ei 1i ; x 6= X. We proceed according
to the following steps: 1)  (m) = x, 2) x 2 max<j X for all j 2 Nn fig, and
3) x 2 F (<).
Step 1.  (m) = x
It is obvious that  (m) = x if #X = 2. Otherwise, let us consider the
case that #X > 2. To show that  (m) = x under the supposition that
#X > 2, assume, to the contrary, that  (m) 6= x. Then,  (m) = x xi and
xi 2 L  Ei 1i ; x n fxg, otherwise an immediate contradiction is obtained.
Suppose that for some y 2 Xn fx; xig it holds that y j  (m) for some
j 2 Nn fig. Then, agent j can induce the modulo game by changing mj
into mj =
 
Ejj;Ejj+1; y; kj

. To attain y agent j has only to adjust kj
by which he becomes the winner of the modulo game, which contradicts
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that m 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Otherwise, suppose that, for each j 2 Nn fig,
 (m) <j y for all y 2 Xn fx; xig. Suppose that xi j x for some j 2 Nn fig.
As <j is a monotonic extension of <j it follows that xi j xi  x. By
our supposition that #X > 2, agent j can induce the modulo game by
choosing any y 2 Xn fx; xig and changing his message announcement mj
into mj =
 
Ejj;Ejj+1; y; kj

. To attain xi agent j has only to adjust kj
by which agent i becomes the winner of the modulo game, contradicting
that m 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Then, it holds that x <j xi for all j 2 Nn fig.
Suppose that x j xi for some j 2 Nn fig. Then, agent j can induce the
modulo game by choosing any y 2 Xn fx; xig and changing his message
announcement mj into mj =
 
Ejj;Ejj+1; y; kj

. To attain x agent j has
only to adjust kj by which agent ` 2 Nn fi; jg becomes the winner of the
modulo game, contradicting that m 2 N (M; ;R (<)). Therefore, as <` is
a complete preorder for each participant ` 2 N , it follows that x j xi for all
j 2 Nn fig. It follows that x; xi 2 Tj2Nnfigmax<j X which contradicts the
top-coincidence condition. This concludes step 1, that is,  (m) = x.
Step 2. x 2 max<j X for all j 2 Nn fig
Suppose that #X > 2. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<)) it follows that x 2
max<j X for all j 2 Nn fig as any agent j can trigger the modulo game
and obtain any other outcome in X. Otherwise, let #X = 2. We proceed
according to whether n > 3 or n = 3. In each of the following sub-cases we
show that x; xi 2  (Mj;m j) for each j 2 Nn fig. Since  (m) = x, by Step
1, it su¢ ces to show that each agent j 6= i can attain the outcome xi.
Sub-case 3.1. #X = 2 and n > 3
Then, agent j 6= i can induce the modulo game by changing his outcome
announcement into xi so as to make #f` 2 N jx` = xig  2 and #f` 2
N jx` = xg  2. To attain xi agent j has only to adjust the integer index kj
by which agent i becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Sub-case 3.2. #X = 2 and n = 3
Then, agent j 6= i can changemj intomj =
 
Ejj;Ejj+1; xi; kj

= (Ej;Ej+1; xi; kj).
We proceed according to whether j + 1 = i or not.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.1. j + 1 = i
Suppose that Ejj+1 6=Eii. Then, the modulo game is triggered. To attain the
outcome xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he becomes the winner of the
modulo game. Otherwise, let Ejj+1=Eii. Suppose that xi =2 F
 
Ejj;Eii;Eii+1

.
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Thus, the message prole
 
m j;mj

falls intoRule 4. To attain the outcome
xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he becomes the winner of the modulo
game. Otherwise, let xi 2 F  Ejj;Eii;Eii+1. Suppose that  m j;mj falls
into Rule 3. Then, 
 
m j;mj

= xi, as sought. Otherwise,
 
m j;mj

falls
into Rule 4. Again, to attain xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he
becomes the winner of the modulo game.
Sub-sub-case 3.2.2. j + 1 6= i
Then, j 1 = i. Suppose thatEii+1 6=Ejj. Thus, the message prole
 
m j;mj

falls into Rule 4. To attain xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he be-
comes the winner of the modulo game. Otherwise, let Eii+1=Ejj. Suppose
that xi =2 F  Eii;Ejj;Ejj+1. Again, the message prole  m j;mj falls into
Rule 4. To attain the outcome xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he be-
comes the winner of the modulo game. Otherwise, let xi 2 F  Eii;Ejj;Ejj+1.
Suppose that L
 
Ejj+1; xi
 6= X. Then,  m j;mj falls into Rule 3, and so

 
m j;mj

= xi, as sought. Otherwise,
 
m j;mj

falls into Rule 4. To
attain xi agent j has only to adjust kj so that he becomes the winner of the
modulo game.
Since the above arguments hold for any j 2 Nn fig, we have that x; xi 2
 (Mj;m j) for each j 2 Nn fig. Since m 2 N (M; ;R (<)) it follows that
x 2 max<j X for all j 2 Nn fig, otherwise we fall into a contradiction.
Step 3. x 2 F (<)
By steps 1 and 2, we have that  (m) = x and x 2 max<j X for all j 2
Nn fig. The top-coincidence condition implies that fxg = Tj2Nnfigmax<j X.
Then, it is also an equilibrium for all agents to send the message m, where
mj = mj for all j 2 Nn fig and mi =
 
Eii,Eii+1; xi; 

=
 
Ei 1i ,Ei+1i+1; x; 

,
so that m falls into Rule 1. The same reasoning used above for m 2
N (M; ;R (<)) falling into Rule 1 carries over into m so that we obtain
x 2 F (<), as sought.
Suppose that m falls into Rule 4. Then,  (m) = x`(m) where agent ` (m)
is the winner of the modulo game. Every agent i can alter the current
choice to any other outcome in X by unilateral deviation. Since m is a Nash
equilibrium message prole, it follows that  (m) 2 max<i X for all i 2 N .
Top-coincidence implies that f (m)g = Ti2N max<i X. Weak unanimity
implies  (m) 2 F (<), as sought. 
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4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we deal with the informational e¢ ciency issue pertaining to
Benoît-Oks Theorem (Benoît-Ok, 2008). We focus on mechanisms in which
each agent reports to the planner her own preference and her neighbors
preference solely, in addition to a feasible social outcome and an agent index
(Saijo, 1988). We show that the class of weakly unanimous SCC s that are
Nash-implementable by simple stochastic mechanisms endowed with Saijos
message space reduction is fully identied by Maskin monotonicity when the
condition of top-coincidence is imposed on environments.
With regard to Nash implementation theory, the main implication of the
reported analysis is the following. The class of weakly unanimous SCC s
that are Nash-implementable via simple stochastic mechanisms is equivalent
to the class of weakly unanimous SCC s that are Nash-implementable by a
simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijos strategy space reduction.
Note that this result is in line with other well known results of Nash imple-
mentation. In particular, the reported equivalence result is analogous to the
equivalence relationship between Nash implementation by s-mechanisms and
Nash implementation in general social choice environments (Lombardi and
Yoshihara, 2010).
Before closing the paper, we should make one last comment about the
result presented here. Our result is built on the implicit assumption that
agents involved into a mechanism are selsh and perfectly rational. Dissat-
isfaction with this classical assumption is mounting. Attempts to replace
it with alternative decision models as engines of inquiry into basic economic
questions are ourishing. In the light of this recent trend, the reported equiv-
alence relationship may not necessarily hold when a small departure from the
perfect rational manparadigm is considered.
With regard to Nash implementation, a notion of partial honesty has
been introduced and Nash implementation problems with partially honest
agents have been studied. A partially honest agent is an agent who has
preferences over message proles and displays concerns for two dimensions
in lexicographic order: (1) her outcome and (2) her truth-telling behavior.
In the presence of partially honest agents, the equivalence relationship be-
tween Nash implementation and Nash implementation by s-mechanisms no
longer holds, as Lombardi and Yoshihara (2011) show. This suggests that the
equivalence relationship indispensably relies on the assumption that agents
act purely to advance their own self-interest and are not inclined to attach
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(moral) rights and duties to their acts. We conjecture that this break-down
extends to Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms.
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